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Abstract
In September 2021, the Italian Bankruptcy Law will be replaced
by a new comprehensive Act, the so-called Business Crisis and
Insolvency Code.
Two topics have immediately become the “mantra” of this
important reform: a) the introduction into the domestic legal
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framework of early warning tools and alert procedures, along the
lines of the French experience; and b) the introduction of a
specific obligation on the entrepreneur or the management body
of collective entities to implement suitable measures or establish
appropriate organizational structures to prevent future insolvency
and preserve the business continuity.
These measures are closely related, insofar as the obligation to
implement appropriate organizational arrangements is deemed
crucial for the early warning system to be effective in preventing
and detecting financial distress, and they should work in synergy.
This article will focus on Italian entrepreneurs’ obligation to
implement appropriate organizational arrangements, in order to
evaluate its real impact on Italian micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises, MSMEs. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises
play a key and crucial role in the Italian economy, even more
important than in other European countries, and it is interesting
to investigate what will change in the immediate future as a
consequence of the abovementioned reform, and what change
would be desirable.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Italian Bankruptcy Law (Legge fallimentare),1 adopted in 1942
and subsequently amended numerous times, will finally be retired in
August 2021, and will be replaced by a new comprehensive Act—the
Code of Business Crisis and Insolvency (Codice della crisi d’impresa e
dell’insolvenza, hereinafter “the Code”). 2 This Code was enacted by the
Italian Government in January 2019—on the basis of a delegation granted

*

Associate Professor of Business Law, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy; email:
alessandra.zanardo@unive.it. I am grateful to Andrew Dawson, Adrian Walters, Christoph
Henkel, and Laura Coordes for the organization of the International Comparative
Insolvency Symposium at the University of Miami (Nov. 14–15, 2019) and to all the
participants for their helpful comments.
1
Regio Decreto 16 marzo 1942, n.267, G.U. Apr. 6, 1942, n.81 (It.).
2
Decreto Legislativo 12 gennaio 2019, n.14, G.U. Feb. 14, 2019, n.38 (It.).
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by the Parliament3—after a long procedure started in January 2015, when
a special Commission was appointed.4
The Code, which consists of 391 articles, was published in the Official
Journal on 14 February 2019, and it should have entered into force 18
months after the publication, except for certain provisions concerning
corporate governance, which already entered into force on March 16,
2019. But its entry into force has been recently postponed to September 1,
2021 due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
The 2019 reform has heavily amended the existing bankruptcy
(fallimento), insolvency and preventive restructuring proceedings,
including the consumer insolvency proceeding, as well as significant
provisions of the Italian Civil Code (hereinafter “C.c.”) concerning
directors’ duties, supervisory bodies of companies, and the compensation
for damages caused by negligent directors, officers, and statutory auditors.
Although the innovations introduced by the new Code are many, two
are topics that have become the “mantra” of the Italian reform. The first is
the very controversial introduction into the domestic legal framework of
early warning tools and alert procedures, along the lines of the
consolidated French experience.5 The second is the introduction as a legal
norm—or “as a general clause”6—of a specific obligation of the
(individual) entrepreneur and the management body of a collective entity
to implement suitable measures or establish appropriate organizational
structures in carrying out the business activity,7 in order to prevent future
insolvency and preserve the business continuity.8
3

Legge 19 ottobre 2017, n.155, G.U. Oct. 30, 2017, n.254 (It.).
The Commission, known as the Rordorf Commission, was chaired by Renato Rordorf,
the then President of the first Chamber of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation. For
details, see Enrica M. Ghia & Filippo Bosazzi, Pre-insolvency column: Crisis management
under Italy’s new Rordorf, GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING REV. 43–44 (Jan. 2018).
5
Loi n.84-148 du 1 mars 1984 relative à la prévention et au règlement amiable des
difficultés des entreprises [on the prevention and friendly settlement of business
difficulties], J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 2, 1984, p. 751, as subsequently amended. An exhaustive description of the
French regulation can be found in LAETITIA ANTONINI-COCHIN & LAURENCE CAROLINE
HENRY, DROIT DES ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 33–48 (2d ed. 2019); ANDRÉ JACQUEMONT
ET AL., DROIT DES ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 41-52 (10th ed. 2017); FRANÇOISE
PÉROCHON, ENTREPRISES EN DIFFICULTÉ 46–61 (10th ed. 2014).
6
Paolo Montalenti, Gestione dell’impresa, assetti organizzativi e procedure di allerta
dalla “Proposta Rordorf” al Codice della crisi, in AMEDEO BASSI ET AL., LA NUOVA
DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI 482, 483 (2019).
7
In this article, the term “organizational structure” is sometimes used for brevity to mean
“organizational, administrative, and accounting structure”, although these three words refer
to specific arrangements. See, infra, Part II.
8
Indeed, another significant innovation is the introduction of an organic regulation of crisis
and insolvency of enterprise groups. Supra note 2, at Part 1, Title VI.
4
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Early warning tools and alert procedures are out-of-court, confidential
legal mechanisms aimed at the prompt detection of signs of financial
distress of an enterprise, including the loss of business continuity, as well
as quick adoption of the most suitable remedies to overcome the crisis and
restore the going concern.9 They are activated, in Italy,10 through a written
notice sent by: a) the supervisory body of a company—the board of
statutory auditors (collegio sindacale) or single statutory auditor,11 the
supervisory board (in the tier-board system), the management control
committee (in the one-tier system), and/or the external auditor or auditing
firm—if certain sector-specific indicators are met;12 or b) certain qualified
public creditors—namely, the Revenue Agency, the National Social
Security Institute, and the tax collection agent—in the event of
indebtedness for taxes (e.g., VAT) or social security contributions
exceeding the thresholds (different for each public creditor) provided by
the Code.13
9

The Code explicitly refers to both terms: early warning or alert tools (strumenti di allerta)
and alert procedures (procedure di allerta). See id. Art. 12.
10
In France, differently from Italy, the early warning tools are several and involve many
subjects or bodies: commissaire aux comptes (auditor), comité social et économique (works
council), associés or actionnaires (company’s members o shareholders), président du
tribunal de commerce (president of the commercial court), groupement de prévention
agréé (prevention group accredited by an order of the State representative in the region).
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] arts. L. 234-1–234-4 (Fr.); CODE
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] arts. L. 2312-63–2312-69 (Fr.); CODE DE COMMERCE
[C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 223-36 (Fr.); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.]
[COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-232 (Fr.) CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL
CODE] arts. L. 611-1–611-2-1 (France). The only French early warning tool that has been
transplanted into the Italian legal framework is the alert procedure commenced by the
auditors (commissaires aux comptes), even though the differences between the two national
systems are significant: see Federico Pernazza, The Legal Transplant into Italian Law of
the Procédure d’Alerte. Duties and Responsibilities of the Companies’ Bodies, 3(2) THE
ITALIAN L.J. 553, 553–81 (2017); see also Federica Innocenti, Le procedure di allerta nella
legislazione francese e nella prossima riforma delle discipline della crisi d’impresa e
dell’insolvenza: due modelli a confronto, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO 971–1003
(2018). In particular, the alerte par le commissaire aux comptes is not based on financial
indicators and is characterized by the involvement, in case of no or inadequate reply by the
chairman of the board of directors or the management board, of the president of a
commercial court instead of a non-judicial body (see infra, note 13).
11
In Italian limited liability companies, the control body may consist of a single statutory
auditor pursuant to Article 2477 C.c.
12
See Art. 13 of the Code. According to some authors’ opinion, indeed, it would be
advisable that the company statutory or external auditors activate the alert process even
before, when there are signals of business vulnerability. See, e.g., Mauro Bini, Procedura
di allerta: indicatori della crisi ed obbligo di segnalazione da parte degli organi di
controllo, 38(4) LE SOCIETÀ 430–37 (2019).
13
The notice is first sent to the debtor and, subsequently, in case of no or inadequate reply
by the debtor or his inactivity, to the so-called OCRI—i.e., the new non-judicial body for
the settlement of crisis: see Arts. 14 and 15 of the Code. OCRI is a panel of experts
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The abovementioned measures are closely related, insofar as the
obligation to implement appropriate organizational arrangements is
deemed crucial for the alert system to be effective in detecting financial
difficulties and preventing a business’s slide into insolvency or its
insolvent position worsening. As a general rule, this obligation or duty
plays a crucial role in facilitating the prevention and/or the prompt
detection of financial crisis even when early warning tools may not
actually be activated.14
The debate among legal practitioners and scholars on both preventive
measures are currently very lively and they will continue for some time,
considering that the Code will soon be amended to revise some controversial
aspects and, hopefully, to adapt its provisions to the recent EU Directive on
preventive restructuring frameworks, discharge of debt and disqualifications. In
this regard, I must point out that in February 2020 the Italian Government
approved a draft legislative decree. This draft decree amends, among other things,
some provisions relating to the alert mechanisms, but many aspects of the relevant
regulation remain a moot point.
This article will focus on the legal obligation of Italian entrepreneurs to
establish or implement appropriate organizational structures or measures, in order
to evaluate its impact on Italian micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises
(MSMEs)—i.e., enterprises employing fewer than ten workers. MSMEs play a
key and crucial role in the Italian economy, even more than in other EU Member
States or European countries. It is therefore interesting to investigate what will
change, if anything does, as a consequence of the 2019 reform, considering the
size, features, and attitudes of the Italian entrepreneurs.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II will focus on the content of the new
entrepreneurial obligation provided by the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code.
Part III will examine some significant issues emerging from this obligation. Part
IV will focus on the positive and negative aspects of the provisions relating to the
implementation of organizational arrangements. Part V will compare the Italian
approach and trends in preventing insolvency and ensuring business viability,
firstly with the approaches of other European countries (France, Germany, Spain,
and the UK), and secondly with recent developments at the EU and international
level. In Part VI, some preliminary concluding remarks will be drawn.
established in each local Chamber of Commerce: see Eugenio Vaccari, The New ‘Alert
Procedure’ in Italy: Cross-fertilization or Legal Transplant?, paper presented at 20th
INSOL International Academics’ Colloquium (London, 2018), who investigates if and to
what extent Italian OCRI represents an example of legal transplant or cross-fertilization
from practices of other jurisdictions.
14
The first type of alert can be activated only in companies where a supervisory body has
been appointed: namely, all joint-stock companies, the limited liability companies
exceeding certain thresholds (one out of three thresholds) or meeting specific requirements
set forth by Article 2477 C.c., and the limited liability companies that voluntarily appoint
one or more statutory auditors or external auditors. It is important to highlight that these
thresholds have been significantly reduced by the Code, thus extending the number of
limited liability companies obliged to appoint a supervisory body.
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THE OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: A NEW OBLIGATION
FOR ENTERPRISES?

According to Article 375, which has amended Article 2086 C.c., and
Article 3, para. 2, of the Code, any business entity—companies and other
collective entities, such as (general and limited) partnerships, non-profit
organizations, consortia, business networks15—has the duty (i) to establish
(and maintain) an organizational, administrative, and accounting structure
that is appropriate to the nature and the size of the business also in relation
to the prompt detection of financial distress (crisis) and the enterprise’s
inability to continue as a going concern; and (ii) to activate promptly the
establishment and the implementation of one of the tools provided by the
law for overcoming the crisis and recovering business continuity.16 This
law provision entered into force on March 16, 2019. Its application is not
limited to enterprises that are in the zone of insolvency or even insolvent,
and its application has a wider scope than the detection of a financial crisis
in its early stages.17 The use of the word “also” in Article 2086, para. 2,
C.c. and the inclusion of such a provision in the Italian Civil Code,
precisely in the part containing general rules on business, support this
statement.18
With regard to sole proprietorship, Article 3, para. 1, of the Code is
quite different insomuch as it only provides that the individual
entrepreneur shall adopt measures suitable to detect the status of crisis
early and, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, adopt the necessary
remedies promptly. This section, unlike Article 2086 C.c., is contained in
15

Article 2086, para. 2, C.c. extends the obligation to “entrepreneurs that operate in
corporate or collective form.”
16
The reference to one of the tools provided by the law is ambiguous since it might be
interpreted as only referring to judicial restructuring proceedings and out-of-court
restructurings. For an extensive interpretation of this part of the rule, see Vincenzo Di
Cataldo & Serenella Rossi, Nuove regole generali per l’impresa nel nuovo Codice della
crisi e dell’insolvenza, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO 745, 754–56 (2018).
17
See Assonime (Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies), Le nuove regole
societarie sull’emersione anticipata della crisi d’impresa e gli strumenti di allerta,
Circular
No.
19/2019,
http://www.assonime.it/attivitaeditoriale/circolari/Pagine/circolare-19-2019.aspx, at 20–21; Paolo Benazzo, Il Codice
della crisi di impresa e l’organizzazione dell’imprenditore ai fini dell’allerta: diritto
societario della crisi o crisi del diritto societario, 64(2–3) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 274,
275–76, and 283 (2019); Ilaria Capelli, La gestione delle società di persone dopo il Codice
della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza: una prima lettura del nuovo art. 2257, primo
comma, c.c., 2 RIVISTA ODC 313, 317–19 (2019).
18
Different formulations of Article 2086 C.c. and of Article 3, para. 1, of the Code will be
discussed immediately below.
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the Business Crisis and Insolvency Code and has not yet entered into force:
the date of its entry into force is that of the overall reform package
(forthcoming September 2021). The same date for both rules would have
been more reasonable and consistent with the objective of the reform.
I firstly point out that the new obligations cannot actually be qualified
as an early warning tool, even though this opinion is quite common among
scholars and commentators.19 The organizational obligations are the
prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the alert tools and procedures,
and they operate even in enterprises to which the early warning
mechanisms explicitly do not apply, such as listed companies, large
corporations, or credit institutions.20 The textual formulation of Article 12
of the Code supports this interpretation. Article 12 delineates what early
warning tools are permitted under the new Italian legislation.21
Moving then to their specific content, it is beyond doubt that running
a business—every business, whatever its size (number of workers, the
volume of transactions, etc.) or legal status—requires a certain level of
organization (primarily of persons) and planning, at least informal
planning.22 The general definition of an entrepreneur, contained in Article
2082 C.c., explicitly mentions organization as an essential requirement.23
Therefore, some scholars and commentators—included the President of

19

See, e.g., Benazzo, supra note 17, at 277, 298; Michele Perrino, Crisi di impresa e
allerta: indici, strumenti e procedure, 36(5) IL CORRIERE GIURIDICO 653, 657–58 (2019);
RICCARDO RANALLI, LE MISURE DI ALLERTA. DAGLI ADEGUATI ASSETTI SINO AL
PROCEDIMENTO AVANTI ALL’OCRI 26 (2019); Paola Vella, L’allerta nel codice della crisi
e dell’insolvenza alla luce della Direttiva (UE) 2019/1023, CRISI D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA
6-10 (July 24, 2019), https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/1124.pdf.
20
But see EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE, INSTRUMENT OF THE EUROPEAN LAW INSTITUTE –
RESCUE
OF
BUSINESS
IN
INSOLVENCY
LAW
(2017),
https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/Instrumen
t_INSOLVENCY.pdf, Recommendation 1.21 (“Member States should provide for and
support early warning mechanisms that detect a deteriorating business development and
signal the respective urgency to act. Possible instruments are accounting and monitoring
duties for the debtor or the debtor’s management according to company or tax law as well
as reporting duties under loan agreements (covenants).”).
21
See, e.g., Luciano Panzani, Il preventive restructuring framework nella Direttiva
2019/1023 del 20 giugno 2019 ed il codice della crisi. Assonanze e dissonanze, CRISI
D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA 3–4 (Oct. 14, 2019), https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/1134.pdf;
Banca d’Italia [Bank of Italy], Observations on “Schema di decreto legislativo recante
Codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza in attuazione della legge 19 ottobre 2017,
n. 155”, Commissione Giustizia – Senato della Repubblica (26 Nov. 2018).
22
See generally DANILO GALLETTI, LA RIPARTIZIONE DEL RISCHIO DI INSOLVENZA, 157–255
(2006).
23
Namely, according to Article 2082 C.c., an entrepreneur is a (natural or legal) person
who professionally carries out an “organized” economic activity for the purpose of
producing or exchanging goods or services.
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the Reform Commission24—have minimized the forthcoming effects of
the new rules, holding that the obligation to establish adequate
organizational arrangements already existed in the domestic legal
framework as it is an intrinsic, essential element of the basic definition of
entrepreneur.25
I am not persuaded by this argument, at least as regards the first part
of the new rules (namely, the obligation to implement suitable measures
or appropriate organizational structures). Firstly, the term “organized”
contained in the original definition of an entrepreneur essentially refers to
a minimum level of organization of workers and/or assets, directed and
coordinated by the entrepreneur to carry out a business activity (Articles
2086, para. 1, and 2555 C.c.),26 distinguishing entrepreneurs from
independent workers.27 The new obligation introduced by the Code,
instead, has a more defined and prescriptive content, as well as a different
rationale—that is, primarily, the early and prompt detection of financial
difficulties experienced by the entrepreneur and the prevention of future
insolvency. The idea behind the provisions in both Article 2086 C.c. and
24

See Renato Rordorf, Hearing before the Second Commission (Justice) of the Chamber
of Deputies, Indagine conoscitiva in merito all’esame dello schema di decreto legislativo
recante codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.camera.it/leg18/1079?idLegislatura=18&tipologia=indag&sottotipologia=c0
2_crisi&anno=2018&mese=12&giorno=04&idCommissione=02&numero=0002&file=in
dice_stenografico#stenograficoCommissione.tit00110, at 203.
25
See, e.g., Andrea Bartalena, Le azioni di responsabilità nel codice della crisi d’impresa
e dell’insolvenza, 41(3) IL FALLIMENTO 298, 300–01 (2019); Riccardo Russo, Collegio
sindacale e prevenzione della crisi d’impresa, 45(1) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 119,
139–40 (2018-I); Marco S. Spolidoro, Note critiche sulla “gestione dell’impresa” nel
nuovo art. 2086 c.c. (con una postilla sul ruolo dei soci), 64(2–3) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ
253, 262–63 and 267–68 (2019); and, under the previous law, see Vincenzo Buonocore,
Adeguatezza, precauzione, gestione, responsabilità: chiose sull’art. 2381, commi terzo e
quinto del codice civile, 33(1) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 5, 18–19 (2006-I); MARINA
SPIOTTA, CONTINUITÀ AZIENDALE E DOVERI DEGLI ORGANI SOCIALI 32–50 (2017). But see
Benazzo, supra note 17, at 282–85; Alessandro Nigro, Il “diritto societario della crisi”:
nuovi orizzonti?, 63(5–6) RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 1207, 1218–19 (2018); and Roberto
Sacchi, Sul così detto diritto societario della crisi: una categoria concettuale inutile o
dannosa?, 41(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1280, 1286–87 (2018), who all offer
an alternative, and slightly different, interpretation of the merit of these rules.
26
Article 2086, para. 1, C.c. provides that the employer is the head of the undertaking, on
whom his collaborators hierarchically depend. Article 2555 C.c. provides the definition of
business (azienda), stating that it is an aggregate of assets organized by the entrepreneur
for conducting a business activity. The key element of a business (or ongoing business) is
the functional coordination of all assets for the purpose of carrying out a business activity.
27
See, e.g., Antonio Cetra, La fattispecie “impresa”, in DIRITTO COMMERCIALE. I. DIRITTO
DELL’IMPRESA 25, 33–34 (Marco Cian ed., 2017); GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO, DIRITTO
COMMERCIALE. 1. DIRITTO DELL’IMPRESA 27–28 (Mario Campobasso ed., 7th ed. 2013);
EVA R. DESANA, L’IMPRESA FRA TRADIZIONE E INNOVAZIONE 27–30 (2018); FRANCESCO JR
FERRARA & FRANCESCO CORSI, GLI IMPRENDITORI E LE SOCIETÀ 31-34 (14th ed. 2009).
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Article 3 of the Code is that the implementation of appropriate
organizational arrangements is a prerequisite for assuring efficient
management of an undertaking and for preventing deterioration of the
business. These provisions, applicable to all enterprises in any stage of
their lifecycle, have a clear programmatic value in the reform scenario.28
Secondly, not enough attention, I think, has been paid by
commentators to the fact that, according to Article 2086 C.c., the collective
enterprises are obliged to establish an “organizational, administrative, and
accounting structure”.29 These terms—organizational, administrative,
accounting—are not regarded as equivalent in law and managerial
practice,30 and each of them would require specific implementation,
though subject to a suitability assessment that takes into particular account
the undertaking’s size and nature.
Thirdly, those scholars who minimize the impact of these provisions
usually mention the regulation of Italian joint-stock companies
(s.p.a./società per azioni)—where similar provisions have been in force
since 200431—and the widespread academic trend to interpret these rules
as a principle applicable to limited liability companies (s.r.l./società a
responsabilità limitata) too.32 This is absolutely true, although the new
rules have emphasized and properly focused on the linear functional
relationship between the obligation to implement organizational
arrangements and prompt detection of financial crisis:33 the real innovation
is to have extended such rules outside the scope of companies and their
regulation.34
28

Marco Cian, Crisi dell’impresa e doveri degli amministratori: i principi riformati e il
loro possibile impatto, 42(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1160, 1162–63 (2019);
Alberto Jorio, La riforma della legge fallimentare tra utopia e realtà, in AMEDEO BASSI ET
AL., LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, supra note 6, at 413, 418–19.
29
This formulation replicates those contained in Articles 2381, 2403 C.c., relative to,
respectively, duties of the chairman, executive committee and managing directors, and
duties of the board of statutory auditors of joint-stock companies.
30
Organizational structure, for example, is a system used to define a hierarchy within an
organization (it identifies each job, its function and where it reports to within the
organization), whereas accounting system is a set of methods and procedures for collecting,
classifying, summarizing, and reporting financial information.
31
Arts. 2381, 2403 C.c.
32
See Oreste Cagnasso, Gli assetti adeguati nella s.r.l., in ASSETTI ADEGUATI E MODELLI
ORGANIZZATIVI NELLA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI 573, 578–80
(Maurizio Irrera ed., 2016); Id., Gli assetti adeguati nelle società a responsabilità limitata,
15(2) IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ 11, 15–17 (2017); MAURIZIO IRRERA, ASSETTI
ORGANIZZATIVI ADEGUATI E GOVERNO DELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI 309-12 (2005).
33
See Benazzo, supra note 17, at 286–87.
34
See also Assonime, supra note 17, at 22–23; Niccolò Abriani & Antonio Rossi, Nuova
disciplina della crisi d’impresa e modificazioni del codice civile: prime letture, 38(4) LE
SOCIETÀ 393, 394–95 (2019); Stefano Ambrosini, L’adeguatezza degli assetti
organizzativi, amministrativi e contabili e il rapporto con le misure di allerta nel quadro
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It remains to analyze the second part of Articles 3 of the Code and
2086 C.c., namely the obligation to take appropriate actions without delay
to overcome the crisis and restore the going concern.
It can be argued that, even in collective entities other than companies
(particularly partnerships or non-profit organizations),35 directors or the
persons responsible for the management of undertakings in the zone of
insolvency had some obligation in this regard under the legislation
previously in force, although a specific duty was not explicitly required.36
They, indeed, were required to act with reasonable care and skill in
running the business activity. The position for sole proprietorship was
somewhat different. Under the Italian Bankruptcy Law of 1942, an
individual entrepreneur could only be held criminally liable for
intentionally worsening his distress by refraining from filing a petition for
bankruptcy,37 or for undertaking seriously incautious transactions in order
to delay the opening of the insolvency proceeding if he was then declared
bankrupt.38
It is therefore possible to conclude that the new law provisions are not
merely a clarification of something already implicit in the Italian legal
framework; they do have a substantive value.

normativo riformato, CRISI D’IMPRESA E INSOLVENZA (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/11354.pdf; Massimo Bianca, I nuovi doveri dell’organo di
controllo tra codice della crisi e codice civile, 94(6) IL DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE E DELLE
SOCIETÀ COMMERCIALI 1339, 1343 (2019-I); Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 751;
Enrico Ginevra & Chiara Presciani, Il dovere di istituire assetti adeguati ex art. 2086 c.c.,
42(5) LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 1209, 1233 (2019); Jorio, supra note 28, at 418–
19; Montalenti, supra note 6, at 483.
35
See Article 2260 C.c. on the liability of managing partners, and Article 28 of Decreto
Legislativo 3 luglio 2017 n.117, G.U. Aug. 2, 2017, n.179) (It.), on the liability of the
governing body of non-profit organizations.
36
See, e.g., Bartalena, supra note 25, at 300–01; Spolidoro, supra note 25, at 268–69. But
see Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 754.
37
However, in Italy, unlike the majority of EU Member States, the insolvent debtor is not
formally required to file a petition for insolvency within a specific time. See Gerard
McCormack, Andrew Keay, Sarah Brown & Judith Dahlgreen, European Commission,
Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency: Comparative legal analysis
of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices, 48–53 (Jan. 2016).
38
Art. 217 of the Italian Bankruptcy Law. This provision, titled “simple bankruptcy”
(bancarotta semplice) has been transplanted in Article 323 of the Code.
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE NEW
PROVISIONS
ON
THE
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Articles 3 of the Code and 2086 C.c. pose some significant practical
and theoretical issues.
Firstly, the implementation of organizational arrangements is
essentially seen by Italian entrepreneurs, and sometimes by their
representative associations, as a cost that is added to the already existing
high costs and administrative burden.39 For a significant number of limited
liability companies, these costs include appointing a supervisory body
(statutory auditor/s or external auditor).40
It must be highlighted that MSMEs—i.e., enterprises with fewer than
ten workers—play a key and crucial role in Italy: in 2017, for example,
micro enterprises, which amounted to 95 percent of the “operating”
enterprises (i.e., active enterprises), contributed up to 44.5 percent of total
employment; additionally, in 2015 SMEs contributed up to 78.7 percent
(compared to 69.4 percent on average in the other European countries). A
large number of these are individual entrepreneurs, and the number of
general and limited partnerships continues to be high, even though it has
decreased in recent years. In particular, at the end of 2019, the number of
enterprises registered on the Italian Business Register (that includes active
and inactive enterprises) amounted to 6,091,971, of which 1,763,011 were
limited companies,41 966,872 were partnerships, 3,151,407 were sole
proprietorships, and 210,681 were other types of business entity.
Moreover, a typical feature of Italian undertakings is to be family-run or
family-based.
Additionally, the number of undertakings that entered a voluntary
winding up in late 2018 and in 2019 increased, showing a deterioration in
the profits and growth expectations of the entrepreneurs. In 2019, 78,134

39

According to a survey carried out by CGIA Mestre (the Association of Artisans and
Small Businesses of Mestre), in 2020 the cost of bureaucracy for SMEs will increase by
around 3.7 billion euros (including the expected costs of compliance with the Code). See
the news at http://www.cgiamestre.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Nuova-burocrazia2020-21.12.2019-1.pdf.
40
See note 14, supra.
41
A significant number of them (259,928 at the end of December 2019) are simplified
limited liability companies (s.r.l.s.), namely companies with a minimum share capital of
one
euro
and
a
maximum
of
€9,999.99.
See
the
news
at
https://www.notariato.it/it/news/srl-semplificate-pubblicati-i-numeri-aggiornati-al-2019.
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solvent enterprises entered a voluntary winding up.42 Furthermore, in
2018, economic recovery for SMEs slowed down for the first time since
2013.
In a scenario where supporting new SMEs and businesses is vital to
the European economy and is continually reaffirmed at the EU level, the
introduction of a new obligation for undertakings could hinder the
achievement of this goal and could encourage forum shopping.
The second issue is the opportunity to make the setting up of
organizational, administrative, and accounting structures—which are
traditionally regarded as a prerogative of management and organizational
sciences—the object of a precise legal norm that imposes a duty and limits
entrepreneurial freedom. It can be countered that a similar duty has existed
since 2004 for all Italian joint-stock companies43 and has been gradually
extended by scholars to limited liability companies. Moreover, specific
rules on business organization have been adopted since the late 1990s,
imposing the establishment of organizational structures and models in
certain companies and, sometimes, in other types of undertaking for
various purposes.44
Above all, the Italian Legislator, by means of the new provisions
introduced in the Code, has actually tried to react to the chronic incapacity
of Italian enterprises to promote early restructuring procedures
independently, due, among other things, to their poor attitude toward
implementing organizational arrangements. This is quite clear in the
preparatory documents for the 2019 reform, and it is confirmed by
empirical analysis. I only add, in this regard, that a very limited number of
entrepreneurs in Italy establish budgets, forecast financial statements, or
publish business plans.45 Additionally, MSMEs often have an inadequate

42

See Fallimenti, procedure e chiusure di imprese, Osservatorio Cerved (Mar. 2020),
https://know.cerved.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Oss-Chiusure-4q-2019.pdf
(A
significant number of these enterprises, however, were inactive enterprises).
43
See Art. 2381 C.c.
44
Decreto Legislativo 1 settembre 1993, n.385, G.U. Sept. 30, 1993, n.230 (It.)
(Consolidated Law on Banking); Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58, G.U. Mar.
26, 1998, n.71 (It.) (Consolidated Law on Finance) Decreto Legislativo 8 giugno 2001,
n.231, in G.U. June 19, 2001, n.140 (It.) (providing for a direct liability of legal entities,
companies, and associations for certain crimes committed by their representatives);
Decreto Legislativo 7 settembre 2005, n.209, G.U. Oct. 13, 2005, n.239 (It.) (Code of
Private Insurance); Decreto Legislativo 19 agosto 2016, n.175, G.U. Sep. 8, 2016, n.210
(It.) (Consolidated Law on State-Owned Companies).
45
See Vella, supra note 19, at 29. See also Rapporto Cerved PMI (Cerved, 2019),
https://know.cerved.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Rapporto-PMI_2019_web.pdf,
quoting a survey conducted by PwC Tls, at 123.
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reporting system that does not allow early detection of financial distress;46
nor are treasury systems at present widespread among Italian MSMEs.
The third issue is the regulatory approach to extending the obligation
to establish an organizational, administrative, and accounting structure to
all collective entities, irrespective of their nature, form, size, and scope.
General partnerships, non-profit organizations, legally recognized
business networks, etc., are usually more similar, in terms of
organizational arrangements and organizational needs, to an individual
entrepreneur than a limited liability company, or even more to a joint-stock
company. As I will illustrate in the next paragraph, the rule applicable to
sole proprietorships (Article 3, para. 1, of the Code) has a more general
and flexible content than Article 2086 C.c. We can therefore conclude that
the requirement to establish an organizational, administrative, and
accounting structure in collective entities other than companies raises
some doubts about its proportionality, appropriateness, and real efficiency.
Lastly, what organizational, administrative, and accounting structures
are actually appropriate for a company or a business entity, in particular a
micro or small business? This is not an easy question, as the considerable
number of books and articles written on this topic over the years clearly
shows.

IV.

THE OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT “SUITABLE MEASURES”
OR “APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE,
ACCOUNTING STRUCTURES”: WHAT DOES IT REALLY
MEAN?

Both provisions—the one concerning sole proprietorship and that
concerning collective entities—are formulated in general terms. They
refer, respectively, to the implementation of suitable measures and the
establishment of an organizational, administrative, and accounting
structure appropriate to the size and the nature of the undertaking.
These quite general provisions undoubtedly make the implementation
of organizational arrangements more effective and proportionate to each
entrepreneurial activity and its goals. Organizational structures can look
very different; thus, a tailor-made approach that considers the enterprise’s
46

Lorenzo Stanghellini et al. (eds.), Best Practices in European Restructuring.
Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law 7 n.7 (2018); Co.Di.Re.
Research Team, Italian National Findings (2018), https://www.codire.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Italian-National-Findings.pdf, finding 1.4; Id., Italian National
Report (2018), https://www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Italian-NationalReport.pdf, Part II, finding 3.4.
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needs and resources is necessary. There are no pre-established schemes
with which to comply.
Indeed, the business complexity and the type of organization (simple,
centralized, or multi-functional), the set of policies and procedures, the
level of information flow, the need to implement internal control and risk
management functions and their sophistication,47 the implementation of
integrated software, the importance of the organizational chart and of
formal strategic planning, the level of hierarchy, and the frequency of
financial statements and reporting differ according to a lot of variables: the
market in which the business operates; the typical risks to which it is
exposed; its size, scope, and nature; and external environment factors that
impact the business. All of these features and factors inevitably influence
assessment of the suitability of the organizational arrangements by the
entrepreneur/management and control bodies.
What must be pointed out, firstly, is that the suitability test will be
influenced by the future entry into force of the alert system, because the
organizational structures or measures should permit the calculation of
crisis indexes according to Article 13 of the Code.48
Secondly, as mentioned in Part II, there is no (perfect) correspondence
between the content of Article 3, para. 1, of the Code, relevant to the
individual entrepreneur, and that of Article 2086 C.c., applicable to all
collective entities. The most important difference, and probably the only
one of real significance,49 is that the former provision generally refers to
“suitable measures” to be implemented, while the latter refers to an
“organizational, administrative and accounting structure appropriate to the
size and the nature of the undertaking”. Their diverse formulation is likely
due to the usual simplicity of the organization and planning of a sole
proprietorship compared to that of a company, and, perhaps, to the latent
concern of the Italian Legislator about the risk of imposing excessive costs
on individual entrepreneurs (often artisan entrepreneurs), considering their
size and features.50
47

Specific organizational arrangements, including risk assessment programs to manage the
risk of crisis, must be implemented by state-owned companies. See Art. 6, para. 2, of D.Lgs.
n. 175/2016 (It.).
48
Article 13 of the Code delegates the Italian National Council of Chartered Accountants
and Accounting Experts (CNDCEC) to define the dashboard of indexes that reasonably let
the businesses assume the existence of a crisis. The indexes are illustrated in the draft
document of CNDCEC, Gli indici dell’allerta ex art. 13, co.2 Codice della Crisi e
dell’Insolvenza (Oct. 19, 2019).
49
But cf. Marina Spiotta, Brevi riflessioni sulle discrepanze tra gli artt. 3 e 375 c.c.i.,
ILSOCIETARIO (Oct. 7, 2019), http://ilsocietario.it/articoli/focus/brevi-riflessioni-sullediscrepanze-tra-gli-artt-3-e-375-cci.
50
See also Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 750–51. But see Spolidoro, supra note
25, 260–62.
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It is noteworthy that the first draft version of Article 2086 C.c. referred
to all entrepreneurs, including sole proprietorship, and so does Article 14
of the Delegation Law No. 155/2017, setting forth the principles and
criteria to be complied with by the Government in adopting delegated
legislative decrees.51 The shift from a fully comprehensive provision to
one applicable only to collective enterprises seems to confirm the
uncertainty and the difficulty for the Italian Legislator to properly balance
opposing needs, all fundamental to the running of business activities in a
rapidly changing economic environment. The last version of the law
provision has been reaffirmed by the draft legislative decree amending the
Business Crisis and Insolvency Code, supporting the idea that the
distinction between sole proprietorships and collective entities is, or may
be deemed to be, a precise policy choice made by the Legislator.
However, as I previously pointed out, there are small differences, in
practice, between an individual entrepreneur and a general partnership or
a non-profit organization, or other types of collective entity (e.g., a
consortium).52 If a distinction must be made,53 it would have been more
advisable and appropriate to limit the obligation to establish specific
organizational structures to companies, for which this obligation seems
proportionate. It is indeed quite clear that the Italian Legislator had in mind
the latter when he drew up the above-mentioned section.
In practice, what will probably be required of a sole proprietorship
operating on a small scale, according to Article 3 of the Code, will consist
as a general rule in the preparation of prospective financial information—
at least forecasted or projected cash flow statements54 and, possibly,
annual budgets—in performing periodic checks and adopting an internal
reporting system,55 and, hopefully, in systems of risk assessment (maybe
risk assessment questionnaires).56 There is uncertainty as to whether the
same minimum measures may be deemed appropriate in collective
51

See id., at 260, n.8 (for more information about the draft version of Article 2086 C.c.).
See Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 750–51.
53
Id. at 753 (holding that a distinction between sole proprietorship and other types of
enterprise, characterized by a higher degree of structural complexity, is advisable). But see
Spolidoro, supra note 25, at 260 (arguing that the general clause contained in Article 2086
C.c., which requires the organizational structures concretely implemented by the
undertaking to be suitable to its nature and size, would be sufficient to avoid the risk of
excessive burdens on micro enterprises).
54
The cash flow forecast should be prepared more frequently than the annual accounts in
order to permit the crisis indicators to work—in particular, the DSCR calculation. See the
draft document of CNDCEC, supra note 48, para. 6.2. See ISAE 3400, “The Examination
of Prospective Financial Information,” paras. 3-5 (for a definition of prospective financial
information).
55
See also Ambrosini, supra note 34, at 6–7.
56
Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 128.
52
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entities, particularly in micro entities, in light of what is expressly required
in Article 2086 C.c.57 Although the suitability requirement discussed
above might facilitate an extensive interpretation of the rule,58 doubts
remain.

V.

EUROPEAN UNION
GLANCE

AND

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

AT A

In this new and evolving scenario, it is interesting to compare the
Italian approach to that of the other main European countries, where the
probability of a firm becoming insolvent is significantly lower,59 and to
the EU and international approaches and regulatory trends.
Firstly, I will focus on the French, German, Spanish, and UK
approaches, which seem to differ, to some extent, from the Italian one.60
In these countries, a general provision comparable to Article 3 of the
Code and Article 2086 C.c., applicable to all collective entities—and to a
certain extent, to sole proprietorships—is not provided for in either
insolvency legislation, or civil or commercial codes. What exist are
specific provisions relating to certain enterprises (i.e., limited liability
companies or joint-stock companies, or enterprises exceeding some
thresholds) or limited to a well-defined obligation (e.g., in the field of
security and safety of workers).61
Secondly, the recently adopted EU Directive on restructuring and
insolvency (2019/1023)62 and supranational guidelines will be taken into
consideration in order to ascertain if they include provisions or proposals
that may have inspired the Italian Legislator.
57

Cf. Benazzo, supra note 17, at 276, n.4, 283.
See Assonime, supra note 17, at 28; see also Capelli, supra note 17, at 323–25.
59
Cf. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., Risk Dashboard Annex – Credit Risk Parameters Q2
2019 and Credit Risk Parameters Q3 2019, https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-anddata/risk-dashboard.
60
I will not consider, in this comparative analysis, the national legislation implementing
Article 58 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 4 (providing
that, in the case of a serious loss of the subscribed capital, a general meeting of shareholders
must be called to consider whether the company should be wound up or any other measures
taken), although this obligation could still have a warning function.
61
See, e.g., CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] arts. L. 4121-1–4121-4 (Fr.).
62
The Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks was published in
November 2016. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and
Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge
Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM (2016) 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/201648/proposal_40046.pdf.
58

2020

IMPACT OF THE ITALIAN BUSINESS CRISIS

321

a. France
As already mentioned, in France, early warning tools have been in
force since 1984, and there are a variety of consolidated measures or droits
d’alerte.63 With regards to the second “mantra” of the Italian reform—
namely, the existence of specific rules imposing obligations in the field of
business organization—the French scenario is somewhat different.
Article L. 232-2 of the French Commercial Code provides that
business companies with at least three hundred employees or a net
turnover equal to or higher than 18,000,000 euros must prepare, in addition
to other financial documents, a projected profit and loss statement and a
projected financing plan (compte de résultat prévisionnel and plan de
financement prévisionnel)—in other words, financial projections.64
Moreover, these documents will be analyzed in written reports on the
development of the company prepared by the board of directors or the
management board (or managers in companies other than joint-stock
companies), and the documents and reports will at the same time be
notified to the supervisory board (where established), the auditor, and the
works council.65
The obligation provided by Article L. 232-2 of the Commercial Code
also applies to partnerships, GIEs (groupements d’intérêt économique),
and non-commercial legal persons performing an economic activity that
exceeds certain thresholds.66 However, unlike the Italian rules discussed
above, it only applies to large enterprises with more complex
organizational structures.67
It must also be pointed out that the various French alert mechanisms
do not impose a specific obligation on the entrepreneur or its directors to
react; they continue to have broad discretion in their conduct even after an
alert procedure has been initiated. 68 However, inactive directors
(dirigeants) might be held personally liable for negligence.69

63

See note 10, supra.
The requirement for the application of this provision are defined by a decree of the
Conseil d’État, which also specifies the frequency, deadlines, and terms of preparation of
the abovementioned documents. See ANTONINI-COCHIN & HENRY, supra note 5, at 23–24.
65
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 232-3 (Fr.); CODE DE
COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 232-4 (Fr.).
66
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 612-2 (Fr.).
67
See JACQUEMONT ET AL., supra note 5, at 41.
68
PÉROCHON, supra note 5, at 54 (pointing out that the scope of these measures is to force
the persons in charge of managing the enterprise to open their eyes).
69
Id.
64
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Lastly, the obligation of the debtor or its legal representatives70 to file
for insolvency proceedings (whether in the form of reorganization or
liquidation proceedings) within 45 days of the occurrence of the cessation
of payments pursuant to Articles L. 631-4 and L. 640-4 of the Commercial
Code cannot really be deemed equivalent to the obligation to implement
organizational arrangements suitable to prevent enterprise insolvency,
even though the debtor is meant to control its financial status continually.
As previously mentioned, the focus of the new Italian law is more on the
prevention of insolvency than on its declaration, and the relevant rules kick
in (or should do) at an earlier stage.

b. Germany
In Germany, § 91, para. 2, of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz)
requires the management board to take suitable measures, in particular
surveillance measures, to ensure that developments threatening the
continuation of the company are detected at an early stage. This section,
as it is generally understood, provides for the duty to establish certain
organizational systems,71 and it is formulated in quite general terms.72
Such a rule, however, only applies to joint-stock companies and, by
analogy, to large limited liability companies (despite the lack of a
comparable rule in the Limited Liability Companies Act).73 Furthermore,
for managing directors of German limited liability companies and
members of the management board of joint-stock corporations, the duty to
exercise the diligence expected of a responsible business person includes
the duty, if a crisis threatens, to consider all possible remedial steps and to
initiate such measures.74
70

Failure to do so may lead such persons to be prohibited from being involved in the
management of a business (so-called interdiction de gérer): see CODE DE COMMERCE [C.
COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 653-8.
71
JEAN J. DU PLESSIS ET AL., GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 486 (3d ed. 2017).
72
See Clifford Chance LLP, Mandate of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises – Corporate Law Project (Sept. 2010), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/corp-law-germany-cliffordchance-for-ruggie-sep-2010.pdf, at para. 10 (stating that “[e]stablishing a monitoring
system under the terms of the AktG does not necessarily mean that the management is
obliged to create a comprehensive, all-encompassing risk management system. … the
intended measures shall only ensure that possible risks are recognised at an early stage.”).
73
Id.
74
See Franz Aleth & Nils Derksen, Germany, in RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY 184, 188
(Catherine
Balmond
&
Katharina
Crinson
eds.,
2019),
https://www.freshfields.com/49f85b/globalassets/what-we-do/regulatory/getting-the-dealthrough-2019.pdf, question No. 18. See generally, McCormack et al., supra note 37, at 45
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It must be added that in Germany, as well as in France, when a debtor
(i.e., a company, certain partnerships or an association) becomes illiquid
or overindebted, the managing directors or partners or the liquidators of
the debtor shall file a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings
without culpable delay—at the latest, three weeks after the
commencement of illiquidity or over-indebtedness.75 If they fail to file an
insolvency petition, they are personally liable for damage caused to the
company and its creditors resulting from the undue delay in filing.

c. Spain
The Spanish legal framework does not set out an obligation to
implement organizational arrangements aimed at detecting financial
distress early that is applicable to all businesses, irrespective of their legal
form.
An obligation to file for insolvency, however, is provided in Article 5,
para. 1, of the Spanish Insolvency Law (Ley Concursal): the debtor or the
organization’s directors must request the opening of an insolvency
proceeding within two months following the date on which it knew, or
should have known, about the insolvency. Late filing will lead to an
insolvency proceeding being declared “guilty”—namely, the law
presumes, unless proven otherwise, that the insolvency was fraudulent—
and directors may be held liable wholly or partly for the company’s
debts.76 But I have already explained why I do not consider this rule as
having the same impact on debtors as the new Italian law provisions.
Notwithstanding the different regulatory approaches, it is noteworthy
that a recent survey shows problems in Spain similar to those experienced
by Italian enterprises: the structure of MSMEs, mostly family businesses;
the lack of sophistication of their members or owners, who seek advice too

(“[i]n most Member States there is no specific duty that requires directors to formulate
plans to take preventative action to avoid insolvency or to identify possible insolvency
problems, although it is arguably implicit that they do have some obligation in this regard
as the directors should be managing the company responsibly and in such a way that is
designed to ensure solvency … .”).
75
INSOLVENZORDNUNG [InsO] [INSOLVENCY CODE], § 15a, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/englisch_inso.html
(Ger.);
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 42, para. 2, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.).
76
B.O.E. 2003, 164, arts. 165, 172, and 172 bis (The court ruling classifying the insolvency
as tortious shall also bar the persons affected by the classification from administering the
assets of others for a period of two to fifteen years, as well as from representing or
managing any person or company during the same period).
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late and identify problems at a very late stage; and the still existing
reputational damage or social stigma of insolvency proceedings.77

d. The United Kingdom
In the UK, there are no rules applicable to all businesses requiring the
implementation of organizational arrangements aimed at the early
detection of a crisis. However, the Insolvency Act 1986 provides specific
prohibition of wrongful trading.78
Sections 214 (in case of insolvent liquidation) and 246ZB (in case of
insolvent administration) IA 1986 concern conduct—irresponsible
trading—that occurs when the company has gone into insolvent
liquidation or entered insolvent administration and, at some time before
the liquidation or before the company entered administration, the director
knew, or ought to have known, that there was no reasonable prospect that
this could have been avoided.79 Company directors (and members of
limited liability partnerships) may be liable to make a contribution to the
company’s assets where they have engaged in wrongful trading.80 The
court shall not make an order when the incumbent or former director took
every step that he ought to have taken with a view to minimizing the
potential loss to the company’s creditors.81
The wrongful trading provision clearly diverges from the obligation
provided by the Italian Code, which anticipates the responsible conduct
77

Co.Di.Re. Research Team, National Findings for Spain (2018),
https://www.codire.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-National-Findings.pdf; Id.,
National
Report:
Spain
(2018),
https://www.codire.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-National-Report.pdf.
78
See Ryan Beckwith et al., Nicholson: Decision to Keep Trading Not Always Wrongful,
15 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE RESCUE 157, 157 (2018) (pointing out that “wrongful
trading … [is] one of the main ways that English law encourages directors to focus
carefully and appropriately on the prospects of a company in financial difficulty.”).
79
Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Gr. Brit.); Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 246ZB (Gr.
Brit.). This kind of provision or similar concepts exist in other EU Member States such as
Malta, Ireland, and Hungary. See McCormack et al., supra note 37, at 53–54.
80
Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Gr. Brit.). Apart from personal liability, where a
director engages in wrongful trading, he may be disqualified by court order under the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 if the court thinks fit. See Company
Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46, § 10 (Gr. Brit.). The maximum period of
disqualification is 15 years and the person is prevented from being a director of a company,
acting as receiver of a company’s property or in any way being concerned or taking part in
the promotion, formation or management of a company, and acting as an insolvency
practitioner. Id.
81
Section 214(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. On the issues that exist in relation to the
bringing of actions for wrongful trading in the UK, see Andrew R. Keay, Wrongful trading:
problems and proposals, 65 (1) NORTHERN IRELAND LEGAL QUARTERLY 63–79 (2014).
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and prudent evaluation of the debtor. But it is relevant to the topic at hand,
since it is intended to operate at an early stage too (“at some time before
the commencement of the winding up of the company”),82 although there
are relatively few reported cases and relatively few successes.

e. European Union and International Soft Legislation
As regards the European Union, after Recommendation
2014/135/EU,83 the long-awaited EU Directive on preventive restructuring
frameworks, discharge of debt and disqualifications was finally adopted
on June 20, 2019.
Article 19 of the Directive provides, in very general terms, that
Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency,
directors have due regard, among other things, to take steps to avoid
insolvency. Article 19 does not specify which legislative model or
regulatory approach should be used by the Member States to pursue this
aim: it allows them to retain flexibility as to the most appropriate means
to implement this principle. They could, for example, make use of early
warning tools where applicable, and/or seek professional advice, or even
introduce specific directors’ fiduciary duties toward creditors (in
particular, when the company has become insolvent or is in the zone of
insolvency).
The underlying rationale of Article 19 is to obligate Member States to
impose specific duties on directors in the vicinity of insolvency which will
incentivize them to pursue early restructuring while the business is viable.
In particular, as stated in the European Commission Proposal, “rules on
company managers’ duty of care when nearing insolvency also play an
important role in developing a culture of business rescue instead of
liquidation, as they encourage early restructuring, prevent misconduct and
avoidable losses for creditors.”84
First, the provision refers to “directors,” and thus, it applies only to
certain business entities (in particular, it does not apply to sole
proprietorships).85 Secondly, comparing its content with that of the
corresponding Italian law provisions, it seems quite evident that the Italian
Legislator has taken a step forward by introducing the obligation to
82

Section 214(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. See MICHAEL J. MUMFORD & ALAN J.
KATZ, MAKING CREDITOR PROTECTION EFFECTIVE 51-52 (2010).
83
Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure
and insolvency.
84
See Explanatory Memorandum, para. 1 (“Objective of the proposal”), of the Proposal for
Directive [COM (2016) 723 final], supra note 62.
85
The provision has been partially revised in the last version of the Directive, but without
a real impact on the issue dealt with in this article.
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implement an appropriate organizational set-up even if the business
entity—and, to some extent, the sole proprietorship—is not yet insolvent
or in the zone of insolvency.
The scenario would have been slightly different if some of the
suggested amendments to the provision on duties of directors had been
accepted by the EU institutions.86 In this regard, it must be pointed out that
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law87 explicitly
mentions and recommends a list of appropriate operating steps that
directors might take to avoid insolvency or, where it is unavoidable, to
minimize the extent of insolvency. These steps include evaluating the
current financial situation of the company and ensuring proper accounts
are being maintained and that they are up-to-date; being independently
informed as to the current and ongoing financial situation of the company;
and seeking professional advice, including insolvency or legal advice, so
that any decisions taken can withstand objective and independent
scrutiny.88 The rationale of these UNCITRAL Recommendations seems
close to that of Article 3 of the Code and Article 2086 C.c.
Moving to the early warning, Article 3 of the Directive explicitly
requires Member States to “ensure that debtors have access to one or more
clear and transparent early warning tools which can detect circumstances
that could give rise to a likelihood of insolvency and can signal to them
the need to act without delay”. This provision, as well as Recital No. 22
(“… one or more early warning tools should therefore be put in place to
incentivise debtors that start to experience financial difficulties to take
early action”), shows some similarities at least with Article 3, para. 1, of
86

See the amendments to Article 18 (now Article 19) suggested by the Co.Di.Re. Research
Team, which proposed to introduce the following paragraph: “2. The measures expected
from directors under paragraph 1 might include, among others: the commencement of
honest negotiations with the relevant stakeholders with a view to reaching an agreement,
either by restructuring bilaterally the obligations or by using one of the out-of-court tools
or proceedings existing in the jurisdiction; gathering and evaluating the financial situation
of the business, including, when necessary and feasible, requesting independent advice;
increasing communication amongst directors, and between the former and financial
controllers and the auditor of the entity; modifying management practice to take account
of the interests of creditors and other relevant stakeholders; adopting measures to protect
the value of the key company assets; adopting measures to ensure the continuation of the
debtor’s business when the directors have reasonable grounds for believing that to do so is
in the interests of the creditors as a whole; requesting the commencement of formal
insolvency proceedings.”. See Co.Di.Re. Research Team, Comments to the Proposal for
Directive
[COM(2016)
723
final]
(2018),
http://www.codire.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Re-drafting-suggestions-for-the-EU-Directive-ver-11-final.pdf.
87
U.N. COMM’N. ON INT’L TRADE LAW LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW. PART
FOUR: DIRECTORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN THE PERIOD APPROACHING INSOLVENCY, U.N. Sales No.
E.13.V.10. (2013).
88
Id. at 13–14 (Recommendations 255–256).
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the Code, even though the real impact of the supranational provision will
depend on its implementation by the Member States.
In this scenario, the Italian law provisions may be meant as strict rules,
and the perspective of the domestic legislation appears to be broader than
that of the European Union.
It is then noteworthy that the Commission Proposal of 22 November
2016, in Recital No. 16, stated that possible early warning tools should
include accounting and monitoring duties for the debtor or the debtor’s
management, as well as reporting duties under loan agreements.89 This
statement, however, does not appear in the corresponding Recital No. 22
of the Directive (EU) 2019/1023.
To conclude and complete the analysis, it is opportune to mention
Article 19 of Directive 2013/34/EU, the Accounting Directive.90 It
provides that the management report shall include a description of the
principal risks and uncertainties that it faces, and it may be reasonably held
that the requirement to disclose the main risks and uncertainties in the
annual (and interim) reports obliges companies to install at least a risk and
uncertainty identification system.91 But, again, the scope of the Directive
is limited to specific types of undertaking, listed in Annexes I and II, and
does not encompass all businesses.92 Furthermore, according to Article 19,
para. 3, it is possible for Member States to exempt small (and micro)
undertakings from the obligation to prepare management reports,
considering their limited resources.93

89

Cf. STANGHELLINI ET AL., supra note 46, at 7 (“While it may be considered very creative
and, in fact, euphemistic to qualify personal or management duties as ‘tools’ that debtors
should be given access to and receive concise information about, this approach seems
sensible in theory. Its problems lie on the practical side.”).
90
Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements, and Related
Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC
and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19.
91
Gaia Balp, Early warning tools at the crossroads of insolvency law and company law
24-25 (BOCCONI LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 3010300, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3010300; Christoph Van der Elst, The Risk Management Duties
of the Board of Directors 7 (FINANCIAL LAW INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2013-02,
2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267502.
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See Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 90.
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Id.
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CONCLUSION

To sum up, Article 2086 C.c. and, to a certain extent, Article 3 of the
Code may be meant as strict rules. Their rationale is clear and, in principle,
shareable if we focus on the main objective of the reform—that is the
detection of enterprises’ financial difficulties at an early stage and the
prevention of insolvency.
Some issues and doubts about their effectiveness arise if we look at
the side effects of the new domestic rules when the obligation to
implement appropriate organizational arrangements, though tailor-made,
applies to MSMEs—in particular, to a sole proprietorship, a general or
limited partnership, or a non-profit organization.
Apart from the risk of forum shopping,94 what are these side effects?
Firstly, implementation of the prescribed organizational measures will
undoubtedly increase the compliance burden and the normal costs for
MSMEs,95 at least in the short to medium term, whereas Italian
entrepreneurs, as a general rule, are far from recognizing the importance
of internal control and reporting systems, or the need to plan their business
activities. In this scenario, the trade-off between the perceived benefits of
an appropriate organizational structure and its perceived costs will be
negative—that is, the perceived costs will exceed the perceived benefits.
Secondly, apart from the limited resources of MSMEs, there is a
concrete risk of non-effectiveness (or incomplete effectiveness) of the new
provisions due to the scarce entrepreneurial incentives to observe the law
prescriptions. 96
Violation of the obligation to implement suitable measures or to
establish appropriate organizational structures is not adequately
sanctioned by the law, in particular if the non-compliant entity is a sole
proprietorship, to whom the legal provisions on duties and liability of
94

See Giovanni Strampelli, Verso una disciplina europea dei doveri degli amministratori
nella società in crisi?, in AMEDEO BASSI ET AL., LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA DELLE PROCEDURE
CONCORSUALI, supra note 6, at 637, 642-43. See also Irit Mevorach, Forum Shopping in
Times of Crisis: A Directors’ Duties Perspective, 10(4) EUR. CO. & FIN. REV., 523-53
(2013) (for a general discussion on forum shopping by companies in close proximity to
insolvency).
95
See Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 127-33, where an in-depth analysis of
compliance costs for SMEs is carried out. See also id. at 134-38, where the report also
evaluates the possible positive effects of the new mechanisms to detect financial distress
in terms of enterprise restructuring or more efficient liquidation of the remaining assets,
and it estimates that the overall benefits will greatly exceed the costs in the event of full
compliance.
96
Id. at 129 (explaining that the estimated implementation of measures to detect signals of
crisis will be especially low in micro enterprises without a supervisory body, and these
enterprises will prefer elementary systems).
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directors do not apply, or a general partner, who has unlimited liability for
all partnership debts.97
In addition, as previously mentioned, the obligation to set up an
organizational arrangement is strictly linked to the functioning of the early
warning mechanisms and to the scope to detect financial difficulties
threatening the continuation of the business early. However, there is not a
perfect correspondence, in practice, between those enterprises under the
obligation to establish a suitable organizational, administrative, and
accounting system and to take appropriate actions and those effectively
involved in the forthcoming Italian alert procedures. In Italy, differently
from the various mesures d’alerte provided by the French Code de
commerce, the early warning tools consist essentially of a warning notice
by qualified public creditors when the debtor has not made certain types
of payment (taxes or social security contributions),98 or a warning notice
by the supervisory bodies and/or external auditors of the company. If the
business entity has no supervisory body or auditor—that is, it is a
partnership, a non-profit organization, a consortium, or a limited liability
company that does not exceed certain thresholds—or the debtor is an
individual entrepreneur, the latter mechanism cannot be activated. Even
among companies, those without any supervisory body are the large
majority in Italy.
Thirdly, according to Article 25 of the Code, a business entity that
takes prompt and suitable measures in order to overcome financial
difficulties would have non-negligible advantages, in terms of exemption
from personal liability and criminal offences (or penalty reduction), and
reduction of tax sanctions and interest rate. The adoption of a clear-cut
organizational structure is a prerequisite for taking prompt and active steps
and, thus, to benefiting from such advantages. But Italian entrepreneurs
are traditionally reluctant to reveal their financial difficulties
spontaneously and address them openly, or to draw the obvious
conclusions emerging from their financial statements and accounts. Apart
from socio-cultural factors and the typical features of Italian
undertakings—the separation between ownership and control is very
uncommon and the number of owner-managers is considerably high99—
97

See Di Cataldo & Rossi, supra note 16, at 751.
The most common and valid criticism of this alert tool is that by the time the qualified
public creditor highlights any serious delay in payments, insolvency has already kicked in.
See Roberto Fontana, Hearing before the Second Commission (Justice) of the Chamber of
Deputies, Indagine conoscitiva in merito all’esame dello schema di decreto legislativo
recante codice della crisi di impresa e dell’insolvenza (Dec. 4, 2018), supra note 24, at 911.
99
See Alberto Jorio, Su allerta e dintorni, 43(3) GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 261, 263
(2016-I).
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crisis situations produce additional risks for businesses (e.g., a rush to the
exit for creditors), thus discouraging the entrepreneur’s active role. This
reluctance to file for insolvency or restructuring proceedings, or the habit
to do so very late, is hard to overcome.
Lastly, the approach of the abovementioned European countries,
where provisions on debtor/directors’ obligations only affect debtors that
are large enterprises or limited companies, confirms doubts about the
effectiveness and appropriateness of the new Italian rules.
However, the rigid Italian approach compared to other countries could
also have a positive effect. It may lead to a change of entrepreneurial
culture and mentality and facilitate the development of a forward-looking
rather than a backward-looking approach, by incentivizing the
entrepreneurs to plan their business and periodically review their strategic
plans. In other words, the introduction of the obligation to implement
organizational arrangements could help, in the non-immediate future, to
promote virtuous entrepreneurial behaviors,100 also considering the
possible positive effects of the new legislative measures on MSMEs’
access to credit.101
This, I believe, is the real gamble of the Italian insolvency reform.
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See also Alberto Jorio, supra note 28, at 435.
See Rapporto Cerved PMI, supra note 45, at 137–38.

